Marc Galanter was one of the few to hold back. In his 1981 piece, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, he warned against glorifying nonstate law:
[I]ndigenous law . . . is not always the expression of harmonious egalitarianism.
[Indigenous law] often reflects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based on relations of domination; protections that are available in public forums may be absent.
3
Justice in Many Rooms is anomalous in many ways, combining as it does legal pluralism and access to justice, two themes that make little contact in the rest of the scholarship on legal pluralism. This retrospective takes Justice in Many Rooms as one of a group of pieces produced during the 1980s that fundamentally shifted the conceptual bases for the study of legal pluralism. Focusing on the pluralist side of the piece, the article traces a thread in a subsequent related literature that has given life to Galanter's 1981 reservations about the tone of the early legal-pluralist movement. 4 Scholars have cooled to the view that writing about legal pluralism implies an ideological endorsement of nonstate law. The shift is particularly clear in discussions over the reasonable limits of tolerance in a multicultural society. The cultural defense debate should be read not just as a centerpiece of the multiculturalism discussion, but also as an integral part of the legal-pluralist literature-despite its rather surprising failure to make this link explicit. 25 (1981) .
4. This article refers to the English-speaking movement specifically. Francophone work on "ethnologie juridique" and legal pluralism predates the Anglophone wave of interest. See Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 23-26 (1998) 'Y 279, 297-98 (1987) (characterizing legal pluralism and the concept of interlegality as key components in a postmodern conception of law); Galanter, supra note 3, at 1-2 ("The view that the justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced-or at least distributed-exclusively by the state . . . is deficient. LAW, supra, at 8 (arguing that "legal polycentricity" differs from "legal pluralism" because it approaches law from within the discipline of law, rather than from the "outside" perspective of social science) with Henrik Zahle, The Polycentricity of the Law or the Importance of Legal Pluralism for Legal Dogmatics, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW, supra, at 189 (using "legal polycentricity" and "legal pluralism" synonymously).
For examples of other proposed terms, see also De Sousa Santos, supra note 6 (on "interlegality"); Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 115 (1984) (on "integral plurality"); Galanter, supra note 3, at 17-27 (on "indigenous ordering"); Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (on "private [Vol. 71:139 is Sally Falk Moore's notion of the "semi-autonomous field," a normative order defined by "the fact that it can generate rules and customs and symbols internally," but "is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded."
8
The work of Galanter and his colleagues brought about two major changes in the conception of legal pluralism. The first was the shift from the understanding of legal pluralism as a plurality of norms administered by the state-the model embodied by Hooker's classic study-to an understanding of a plurality existing beyond the state. 9 The second was an attempt to get beyond Hooker in a geographical sense. What Sally Merry calls the "new legal pluralism" was born out of the shift from seeing legal pluralism as a colonial or post-colonial phenomenon in the nonwestern world, to one that exists equally in industrialized, largely western contexts.
III THE CULTURAL DEFENSE
Since the 1980s, excellent work on legal pluralism has been done by scholars who do not explicitly so identify their subject. The best instance of this "unofficial" work on unofficial law is the debate over the cultural defense. The defense has potential applications across civil and criminal domains.
11 However, the literature has focused upon its feasibility as a partial defense to murder. Should an individual convicted of murder have his or her sentence reduced (typically from a mandatory life sentence to a discretionary sentence) if it can be proven that he or she was reacting to a culturally specific act of provocation? The triggering act would not be considered inflammatory to the same degree, if at all, according to the norms of the host society.
Across the common-law and western world, an array of cultural norms and scenarios have produced opportunities to employ this defense. 12 The classic examples entail violence against women. In an Australian case, a Turkish immigrant father murdered his teenaged daughter for engaging in premarital sex, claiming that her behavior constituted provocation to a person of his cultural and religious background. 13 In a well-known American case, a Hmong man accused of kidnapping and raping an underaged woman of his community in California, argued that he had carried out the Laotian tradition of "marriage by capture" (zij poj niam).
14 In another case, a Chinese man living in New York smashed his wife's skull with a claw hammer upon discovering that she had been unfaithful, claiming that a wife's adultery is particularly shameful in Chinese culture. 15 The defense has been attempted by women, too. A conservative Lebanese woman living in Australia killed a male relative when he made sexual advances, claiming that her response was appropriate by her own cultural norms. 16 A Japanese woman living in California drowned her two children and attempted to kill herself upon learning of her husband's extramarital affair. She argued that she had attempted to perform Japanese ritual parent-child suicide (oya-ko shinju), a tradition whose existence was confirmed by a petition signed by 25,000 members of the Los Angeles Japanese community. 17 Several aboriginal [Vol. 71:139 Australian women killed a white Australian man in a drunken brawl after he called one a "black bitch" and another a "slut." They told the court that by aboriginal norms, their violence was the correct response to his insults. 18 Courts have generally been reluctant to endorse the defense. 19 But academic discussants like Renteln, Yeo, and others have been more receptive. 20 Against them is the claim that the cultural defense is impracticable: cultural practices are so time-bound, region-specific, class-based, malleable, and at times contested, as to be effectively unidentifiable and certainly unenforceable. 21 Joseph Raz has made the alternative argument that there is nothing inherently sacred about culture, even when it is determinable. 22 The point is particularly relevant, given a phenomenon often manifested by immigrant groups: the intensification of perceived traditional values in comparison to current social views not only in the host society, but also in the society of origin. 23 The subculture problem is another serious challenge to the cultural defense-or else a reason to extend its ambit. 24 If special exceptions are made for other cultures in our midst, why not for home-grown subcultures as well? If the teenaged "Goth" has a choice in choosing his or her subculture, is it fair to say that the second-generation Wahhabi Muslim exercises no agency in choosing which elements of minority and majority culture to adopt, even if he or she opts for religious associations that represent a marginal subculture themselves? 25 As Shah has argued, the cultural defense assumes that only some ethnic minorities possess cultures, while "white (and black) people do not." 26 The most powerful critique of the cultural defense is the feminist one. A group of American feminist scholars, many of whom identify themselves as female lawyers of East and Southeast Asian descent, argue that the cultural defense decriminalizes violence against minority women, whom they argue are the most common victims in these cases. 27 In "the ultimate trap for a woman of color," the cultural defense casts gender power against racial (or more accurately, cultural) solidarity. 28 Where the courts have been sympathetic to the cultural defense, many Asian American communities have understood themselves to be operating in a law-free space in which violence against women will be tolerated. Women from these communities are less likely to seek the protection of the law. Many feel the state has abandoned them, albeit out of a liberal sense of cultural sensitivity. 29 Echoing elements of the larger discussion amongst political theorists, writers like Rimonte, Volpp, Kim, Choi, Gallin, and Chiu have argued that multiculturalism (in this particular form) is indeed bad for women. 30 
IV

CONCLUSION
Since the 1980s, it has been generally accepted that legal-pluralist scholarship has left the colonial childhood home for good. 31 In fact, there have been frequent visits back. This multicultural turn has meant that work on nonstate, nonethnic norms in western contexts has been drowned out by the deluge of work on immigrant and indigenous people's normative orders, themselves replete with post-colonial resonances. 32 Galanter and his colleagues writing in the 1980s may not have predicted the reemergence of these colonial associations. But Galanter did warn against the tendency to celebrate nonstate law as inherently less objectionable than state law-a view made repeatedly in the discussion of ethnic minority norms, particularly from a feminist perspective. Through the quest for a workable model of tolerance in a multicultural society, what has emerged since 1981 is a less polemical and politically invested approach to legal pluralism. Work on the cultural defense has exposed binaries that complicate the earlier division between left-leaning pluralists and legal centralists, adding the feminist-versus-pluralist opposition into the mix. This antagonistic constellation deserves more attention than it has received, not just from scholars of legal pluralism, but also from those writing on ethnic minorities and law, a field that is particularly well developed in the United Kingdom.
33
At very least, discussants of legal pluralism and the cultural defense need to see themselves as connected. Critics of the cultural defense have made an important intervention in the legal-pluralist literature, giving muscle to Galanter's discomfort with the tone of the early legal-pluralist movement. Why neither side has acknowledged it remains a mystery.
